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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes rhetorically the 1982 Supreme
Court case Plyler v, Doe, sections of the Welfare Reform

Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, and the 2011 version

of the proposed Development, Relief and Education for Alien

Minors (DREAM Act) in order to trace the underlying beliefs
and assumptions that tacitly "justify" refusing
undocumented students support for—and thus access to—

postsecondary institutions.

Analysis of the discourses in

these judicial and legislative documents reveals implicit
ideologies that maintain and propagate a racial and

socioeconomic stratification that keeps undocumented
students on the fringes of American society.

To expose

these hidden ideologies, the author uses critical discourse

analysis (CDA), particularly relying on Norman Fairclough's
theories regarding "common sense assumptions" and his three
tier methodological approach.

Chapter one overviews the

problems that undocumented students face in trying to gain
access to postsecondary education by chronicling these

legal and judicial events, as well as the cultural milieu
which precipitated them.

The author also offers a short

literature review of CDA in the fields of linguistic,

composition, and rhetoric studies similar to the one at

hand in order to illustrate both the method and the
benefits of CDA for this particular rhetorical analysis.
Chapter two analyzes rhetorically the Supreme Court case

Plyler v. Doe using Norman Fairclough's CDA framework to
show how judicial language perpetuates inequitable power

relations.

Chapter three critically analyzes the

discourses in portions of the Welfare Reform Act and the
IIRARA that pertain to undocumented students, discussing

how current ideologies embedded in these documents continue

to marginalize undocumented students.

In addition, chapter

three closely examines the 2011 version of the proposed

DREAM Act, contending that underlying racial ideologies

have kept it from passing into law.

The author concludes

by discussing how critical discourse analysis can lead to
defy and change hegemonic ideologies.
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CHAPTER ONE

LANGUAGE, POWER, AND THE UNDOCUMENTED
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION STUDENT

We are the nation that has always
understood that our future is

inextricably linked to the education of
our children—all of them.

We are the

country that has always believed in

Thomas Jefferson's declaration that
"talent and virtue, needed in a free
society, should, be educated regardless

of wealth and birth"
(Barack Obama, "What's Possible

for Our Children" May 28, 2008)
Surrounded by a group of high school students in a
tiny auditorium in Mapleton Expeditionary School of the
Arts in Thornton, Colorado, then presidential hopeful

Barack Obama addressed the nation on educational reform.

Besides the typical campaign promises of legislative reform
and increased funding for public schools, Obama

reemphasizes education as a ’right rather than a privilege,

a right essential to America's fundamental ideals of life,
1

liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

Nonetheless, he

acknowledges the still existing racial education gap
despite years of civil rights progress: "[TJhere are too
many children in America right now who are slipping away

from us as we speak, who will not be accepted to college
and won't even graduate from high school.

They are

overwhelmingly black, and Latino, and poor" (Obama).

Through this brief televised address, Obama directs
attention to the endemic failures of the American education

system when educating students of color.

Yet Obama, like

most politicians, fails to address the underlying
ideologies in American politics which facilitate the
marginalization of students of color.

Instead of such an

analysis, he offers a tenet of the American Dream: "That is
the promise of education in America, that no matter what we

look like or where we come from or who our parents are,

each of us should have the opportunity to fulfill our God
given potential" (Obama). Undoubtedly, this "promise" of
the equalizing effect of American education is

authenticated by Obama's racially marked presence, as he

exists as an example of how a son of an immigrant and a
student of color can succeed in the modern American

educational system. Thus, despite his welcome concern for
2

the inequities in our education system, Obama's speech

overlooks the possible ideologies that shape past and
present educational policies, and which, in turn, maintain

and even widen the racial education gap.

This master's thesis aims to expose these hidden

ideologies embedded in legal, political, and legislative

discourses, arguing that these ideologies maintain and
perpetuate educational, socio-economic, and even racial

In particular, I am

inequalities in our society.

interested in those discourses surrounding undocumented
students that have worked to limit their access to

postsecondary education, despite a constitutional right to
K-12 public education.

This population of students is most

vulnerable and voiceless because to speak up is to identify

as undocumented and thus risk deportation.

In this

project, then, I examine the language of those legal texts

that have been defining the prospects of undocumented
students for the last thirty years: the 1982 Supreme Court

Case Plyler v. Doe, sections of the Welfare Reform Act and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, and the recently

proposed Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors

(DREAM Act). My goal is to better understand the ambivalent
3

and contradictory treatment of undocumented students, which

has simultaneously held out the promise of the dream and
announced them unworthy of it.
The impetus for my analysis echoes that of linguist

Norman Fairclough: I wish to explore "the theoretical

question of what sort of relationships are between language
and ideology, and the methodological question of how such

relationships are shown in analysis" (Critical Discourse
Analysis 70).

In other words, how do underlying beliefs

materialize in language, and how can we expose these
underlying beliefs?

According to Fairclough, we can come

to understand this language-ideology relationship through

not only analyzing the text and the reader-audience

interaction, but by analyzing the historical context(s) in
which the text, reader, and audience are located.

Because

"discourse is use of language seen as a form of social

practice, and discourse analysis is analysis of how texts

work within sociocultural practice," we must "historicize"
discursive acts (Critical Discourse Analysis 7, 19).

Thus,

to identify hidden ideologies embedded in the legislative
and judicial discourses I have outlined above, and to
better understand the ideological implication of such
discourses on undocumented postsecondary students, we must

4

look closely at the historical contexts in which these

discourses were produced. In the following section, I offer
historical overview of the undocumented student within the
American educational system.

The Undocumented Student in the American
Postsecondary Education System

On August 11, 2002, the Denver Post published a story
that illustrates the difficulties of undocumented students

in economically accessing postsecondary education.
Featured in the story was honor student Jesus Apodaca, a

high school graduate from Aurora Central High School in
Denver, Colorado, who had recently been accepted into the

University of Colorado's computer engineering program.

Yet

because of economics, Apodaca could not afford to attend:

"Without that (in-state tuition), it's too expensive.

I

want to start this fall.

But

I've already been accepted.

I may not be able to go." (qtd. in Riley Al).

According to

journalist Michael Riley, Jesus's family income was limited
to $1200 a month, which would in no way be sufficient to
cover the $7000 out of state tuition per semester.

Like

many American state universities, "CU does not allow
children of undocumented workers to pay in-state tuition.

5

And federal law specifically prohibits federally funded

scholarships to be awarded to undocumented aliens" (Riley).

Thus despite Apodaca's exemplary performance in high school
(he graduated with a cumulative GPA of 3.93), and despite
his receipt of various academic awards (including the

Presidential Education Award), his prospect of a college
education was dim.
Jesus Apodaca's story exemplifies the difficulties

undocumented students currently face in economically
accessing postsecondary education:

although allowed free

K-12 education, many undocumented students do not attend
postsecondary education simply because they cannot afford

it.

Presently, undocumented students have the

constitutional right to receive free primary and secondary

education due to a 1982 Supreme Court decision in the
Plyler v. Doe case.

This case challenged the

constitutionality of a 1975 Texas law which attempted to

limit the influx of undocumented immigrants by denying

access to public education provided to their children.
Professor of Education William Perez explains that Texas

legislators, attempting to decrease the influx of "illegal"
immigrants, prohibited the "illegal" use of public

education.
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In 1975, the Texas Legislature passed a law
(Texas Education Code, Section 21.031) that

denied undocumented immigrants access to public
schools by withholding funds from school

districts that enrolled undocumented children.
This law also allowed public schools to demand
proof of citizenship and to deny admission to
those who could not verify their legal status in

this country.

(Perez xviii)

Ultimately the Supreme Court held that the Texas law
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the Constitution (Perez xix). Maintaining that
"illegal aliens" were considered "persons" under the United

States Constitution, the Supreme Court claimed that keeping

undocumented students out of the public school system was

unconstitutional.

Thus undocumented students are afforded

the promise of free public education.
Yet this dream is cut short after undocumented

students graduate high school.

"Their educational rights

expire once they're beyond compulsory schooling age,"
states Perez.

"Higher education is an elusive dream for

these young adults, with only 10% of undocumented males
and 16% of undocumented females ages 18 to 24 enrolled
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in college" (Perez xix).

The current lack of economic

access for undocumented college students stems from the
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).

The Clinton approved bill

dissuades states from providing postsecondary education
benefits such as in-state tuition, state funded grants, or

work-study opportunities to undocumented students unless

the same type of benefit is offered to any citizen or
national (Protopsaltis 2; Frum 84-85; Russell 2).

Subsequently, most states prohibit undocumented students
from receiving in-state tuition and state financial aid.
Moreover, because they are neither legal residents nor

citizens, undocumented students cannot apply for, qualify
for, nor receive federal financial aid in form of grants,

work-study programs, or student loans (Protopsaltis 2) .
Despite these obstacles, over 50,000 undocumented students
presently attend United States colleges and universities
(Batalova and Fix 1; Zuckerbrod).

Most of these students

arrived as children, and thus they have been educated by

and have graduated from United States public schools.

In

essence, many of the 50,000 undocumented students have been
raised and socialized as American citizens, even if their

birth certificates would show otherwise.
8

And although "an

estimated 65,000 undocumented high school graduates have
grown up in the U.S., they are denied access [to

postsecondary education] available to their U.S.-born
peers," as only "one out of 20 undocumented high-school
seniors attend college" (Protopsaltis 2).

Yet, in spite of

this apparent inequity, neither Congress nor the Senate has
been able to pass a comprehensive legislation to address
the economic disparities undocumented students face.

Many

states tired of waiting for federal law to grant access to
these students, have forged ahead with their own

legislature.

"At least 30 states have considered

legislation to allow undocumented immigrants to receive in
state tuition, and 10 states [including California] have

passed such legislation"; furthermore in three of the ten

states—Oklahoma, New Mexico and Texas—"undocumented
students are also eligible for state financial aid"
(Russell 2J.1

Recent state legislative activity concerning

undocumented students has ignited and fueled interest in
the DREAM Act.

1 As of June 2011, the California State Assembly debates a bill
(AB 131) that would allow undocumented students state funded
financial aid, including fee waivers, Cal-grants, and
institutional aid (McGreevy and Mishak).

9

The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien

Minors Act (DREAM Act) would provide undocumented students
a pathway towards legalization, thus providing access to
postsecondary education and "legal" jobs after graduation.

Drafts of the bill date back to August of 2001.

Although

the House of Representatives passed it on December 8, 2010

it failed to pass in the Senate by a margin of 55 to 41

(Mascaro and Oliphant). The defeat of the DREAM Act
maintains the inequities and denial of access to

postsecondary education that most undocumented students
suffer.

The passage of the DREAM Act would have benefitted

undocumented university and college students by (1)
granting them "residency status in a state in order to

qualify for in-state tuition rates," and (2) by allowing

them "access to state financial aid" (Russell 1).

Failure

to pass this bill continues to force undocumented students
to the margins of American society and economy, as they are
unable to gain the monetary resources to pay for higher

learning.

And for the few that do manage to pay for their

postsecondary studies and graduate, they have little chance
of working legally in the United States or continuing on to

graduate school.

For these students there are two options:

(1) they may choose to return to their country of origin, a
10

country they may remember only in distant childhood

memories; or (2) they (like the rest of undocumented

population) can remain in the United States and "work

illegally in the cash economy" settling "for work as
domestic servants, day laborers, ambulatory sellers, and

sweatshop factory workers" ("Economic Benefits" 2) .
The escalating cost of postsecondary tuition has

driven many to question the allowing of in-state tuition to
undocumented students in states such as California and
Texas.

In 2005, a group of out-of-state students filed a

class action lawsuit in the California Superior Court
(Martinez v. Regents of the University of California),
claiming that California law violates federal law (Frum

87).

This court case echoes contemporary racist anti

immigration sentiments in the United States, exposing a

kind of resentment toward undocumented students.

Fueled by

the misconceptions that undocumented immigrants steal

American jobs, abuse the American welfare system, and

increase crime in the United States, the Martinez case

shows how racial ideologies have fueled the exclusion of
undocumented students from postsecondary education.
Let us return to Jesus Apodaca's story. Perez writes,

"After reading the story, then U.S. representative for the
11

state of Colorado, Tom Tancredo, contacted the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service in Denver and asked

that Apodaca and any of his undocumented relatives be

deported" (xiii). Representative Tancredo claimed that it

is legally and morally wrong to allow undocumented students

in-state tuition:

"It is a very bad idea to reward people

for breaking your law" (Tancredo qtd. in "Lawmaker Seeks to

Deport Family").

This action shows how anti-immigration

ideology is deeply embedded in current public discourse.

For Tancredo, any and all immigrants who live in the United

States are criminals. The fact that Apodaca did not enter
the country legally negates the reality that he was

educated in American public schools since the age of 12,

graduated from an American public high school, and was
accepted into a highly competitive university program.

One

can argue that his rather controversial act to deport
Apodaca and his family to INS authorities seems to be an

authoritarian move by Tancredo.

It may also be construed

as an act of retribution against Apodaca's breaking of his
silence.

For "illegal aliens" are (and should remain)

hidden members of an underclass, living fringes of American
society.

In an ironic turn of events, Tancredo's critics

fired back, as a front page expose in the Denver Post
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exposed Tancredo's hiring of a contracting firm which

Trancredo's

allegedly employed undocumented workers.

response:

"I have never, to my knowledge, hired anybody

illegally." And when referring to the Denver contractor
Creative Drywall Design, the business who allegedly hired
undocumented workers, Tancredo responded, "It's a wonderful
company.

Eilperin).

I would recommend it to anyone"

(qtd. in

His response shows the double standard Tancredo

holds against undocumented immigrants in comparison to
companies that hire undocumented immigrants.

Jesus Apodaca

was breaking the law for living in the United States
"illegally," so needed to be deported immediately.

Yet a

company that allegedly hired undocumented workers did not
deserve a similar call from Tancredo to INS to investigate
the possible illegal hiring of undocumented workers.

Quite

the opposite, the Colorado Representative refers them to

the rest of Denver via the Denver Post.

Of Common Sense and Ideology: Norman Fairclough
and Critical Discourse Analysis
Jesus Apodaca's story and Congressman Tom Tancredo's
reaction show us how racial ideologies underscore the

public discourse in the United States.
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Sociolinguist

Norman Fairclough, in his book Language and Power

articulates how hidden hegemonic ideologies materialize

through language, which in turn legitimizes power.
Fairclough argues "that the exercise of power, in modern

society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and
more particularly through the ideological workings of
language" (2).

Hence, those who control and manipulate

language also control and manipulate power over social,

political, economic, and educative institutions over any
given population.

Yet because hegemonic ideologies are

often socially shared assumptions, the "exercise of power"

is often deeply embedded and hidden within public
discourse.

"Institutional practices which people draw upon

without thinking often embody assumptions which directly or
indirectly legitimize existing power relations" (Language
and Power 27).

Such is the case with legal, judicial, and

political discourses in American society.

They covertly

echo and stealthily perpetuate racial and socio-economic

inequities within the American educative system.
Notwithstanding judicial and legislative precedents like
Brown v. Board of Education and the No Child Left Behind

legislation, the racial inequities in both secondary and

post-secondary are tremendous.
14

According to a recent study

by the National Center for Education Statistics, in 2009
the drop-out rate for immigrant Latino students was a

staggering 32% compared to a 10% drop-out rate for US born
Latinos and a 5% drop-out rate for US born white students

(Aud, et al).

Of the estimated 65,000 undocumented

students who do graduate, only 5 percent attend

postsecondary schools (Frum 81; Protopsaltis 2; Perez xix).
Such disparities suggest underlying racial ideologies
interwoven into very fabric American society.

Yet because

racial ideologies are deeply entrenched within American
social consciousness, they may be difficult to locate and

scrutinize.

Fairclough argues that ideology functions "as an
'implicit philosophy' in the practical activities of social
life, back grounded and taken for granted" (Language and

Power 70).

Thus public discourse articulates the current

philosophical Zeitgeist of any given society.

This is the

case with the limits imposed on undocumented students in
economically accessing postsecondary education:

Racial

ideologies (which include, but are not limited to, beliefs
that undocumented students are criminals, that they leech
off the system, and that it is socio-economically
disadvantageous to the United States to allow undocumented
15

students financial aid) are communicated via public policy
which in turn maintains and perpetuates a socioeconomic and

racial divide in the United States.

To better understand

the racial ideologies that underpin public discourse, close
and critical analysis of political, judicial, and
legislative discourse is necessary.

Because "the impress

of power and ideology on language is not self-evident" or
explicit, Fairclough advocates a critical analysis of
public discourses to bring us closer to understanding how
language maintains and perpetuates racial, political, and
economic inequities in any given society (Language and

Power 130).

By understanding the hidden ideological

workings of these discourses, we can understand how and why
these discourses perpetuate racial and socioeconomic
disparities within American society.

Referred to as either critical language studies (CLS)
and critical discourse analysis (CDA), Fairclough's

critical socio-linguistic approach aims to expose "how
language contributes to the domination of some people by

others" (Language and Power 3).2

Unlike previous language

2 Although Fairclough uses the terms CLS and CDA interchangeably,
in this thesis I will mainly refer to CDA. Ruth Wodak and
Michael Meyer offer an in-depth historical review of critical
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and discourse studies, Fairclough's work goes beyond the

study of discourses and discursive practices.

CLS analyzes social interactions in a way which
focuses upon their linguistic elements, and which

sets out to show up their generally hidden

determinants in the system of social

relationships, as well as hidden effects they may
have upon that system.(Language and Power 4)

Thus critical discourse analysis, or CDA, looks beyond the
discourse and discourse practices, and critically views the
ideological and social context in which these discourses
are created.

Central to Fairclough's critical discourse analysis
theoretical framework is the concept of "common sense

assumptions," which "are implicit in the conventions

according to which people interact linguistically, and of
which people are not consciously aware" (Language and Power

2).

Thus a comment like, "Because they entered the United

States illegally, undocumented students are criminals and

so should not be afforded any type of economic benefit to
attend college," is understood as a "common sense

discourse analysis in their article "Critical Discourse Analysis:
History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology."
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assumption," and may not be construed as a racially
prejudiced comment.

Fairclough claims that such

"ideological common sense" is "common sense in the service
of sustaining unequal relations of power" because it

deflects "attention away from an idea which could lead to
power relations being questioned or challenged—that there

are social causes, and social remedies, for social
problems" (Language and Power 70-71; emphasis added by

Fairclough).

The phrase "undocumented students illegally

entered the United States" deflects from the social causes

of their migration (which includes ill-functioning
economies and or sociopolitical unrest in their home
countries) and the social remedies (which may include

comprehensive immigration reform).

By acknowledging these

social causes and remedies, political and legislative

officials (and the American public) must admit to an
asymmetrical distribution of power, thus destabilizing

existing sociopolitical and economic power structures
within and outside the United States.

Because "common

sense is...in large measure determined by who exercises power
and domination in a society or a social institution"

(Language and Power 76), the creation and perpetuation of

common sense assumption is an act of self preservation by
18

the group in power.

Therefore, maintaining the common

sense notion of undocumented students as criminals helps to
maintain a racial stratification of society, keeping

wealthy elitist class in power.

Previous Critical Discourse Analyses
of Public Policy

A CDA approach to a rhetorical study is by no means

novel.

Nonetheless such discourse analyses are rare and

far in between.

In their essay collection Discourse

Studies in Composition, editors Ellen Barton and Gail
Stygall write that notwithstanding the "robust tradition of
the analysis of language in composition studies,

surprisingly little has been published about different
approaches to the systematic analysis of discourse within
the field of composition studies" (1).

Subsequently Barton

and Stygall's book attempts to bridge the gap between
discourse analysis theories/methodologies and

"What discourse studies,"

rhetoric/composition studies.

such as CDA, Barton and Stygall argue, "brings to
composition, then is both a theory of language in use and a

methodology with which to formulate and test insights about
social interaction and structural analysis" (9).
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That is

the case with critical discourse analysis: Distinctive of
CDA is the focus on how language and power affect one
another in the societal context in which they are

exercised.
In Barton and Stygall's volume, linguist Thomas Huckin

offers a concise overview of the theoretical framework and

methodology of CDA, and how it fits into
composition/rhetorical studies.

In his article "Critical

Discourse Analysis and the Discourse of Condescension,"
Huckin writes that CDA benefits composition/rhetoric

research in that it "offers a powerful arsenal of analytic

tools," as it insists a "close reading be done in
conjunction with a broader contextual analysis, including
consideration of discursive practices, intertextual

relations, and social factors" (157).

Going beyond a

simple rhetorical study where we analyze how language

affects the reader, CDA attempts to investigate how

language affects (and is affected by) not only the reader,
but the social, economic, and political context in which it

is produced.

To go about this type of critical discourse

analysis, Huckin prescribes three major steps when reading
a text: first, the reader must read the text as an

"intended reader"; second, the reader must take a more
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critical or "resistant stance"; and finally the reader must
pay attention to specific discursive features or "textual

details" that signal power relations (158).

It is in this

final step where the abuse of power may become apparent.
To aid the reader in his/her CDA discussion, Huckin offers

a list of "analytical concepts" divided into four domains
or four "levels of granularity":

(1)

The word/phrase level analysis involves the
scrutiny of specific words or phrases.

At this

level one can analyze metaphors, code words, and
connotation.

(2)

The sentence/utterance level analysis includes

the examination of the way in which sentences
interplay.

In this domain one can analyze

register, politeness, and intertexuality.
(3)

The text level entails analysis of how the text

functions as a whole.

Here one can analyze

genre, coherence, and framing.

(4)

The higher concept level analysis looks closer at
"the integrated study of text, discursive
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practices, and broader social context" (Huckin

164).3

After his useful summary of CDA theory and
methodology, Huckin provides a helpful example of a
critical discourse analysis.

In his article, Huckin

studies the political discourse in a response letter from a

United State senator. After asserting the epistle belonged
"to the genre of response-to-a-constituent letter" (166),

Huckin goes on to discuss how the letter contains "the
discourse of condescension," in which Senator Clayton

Johnson asserts his political power over Professor Huckin
through his linguistic choices.

First Huckin finds that

Senator Johnson ignores many of the points Huckin's letter

raises, committing many "textual silences" (167).
Secondly, when noticing the intertextual and

interdiscursive aspects of the letter, Huckin finds a

hodge-podge of various discourses including

"bureaucratese," "fortune-cookie discourse," and
"paternalistic discourse" all of which are meant to show

Senator Johnson as more knowledgeable than the reader,

Professor Huckin (168).

Thirdly, Huckin finds an insincere

7

Although Huckin does explicitly not include Fairclough's
concept of "common sense assumptions," I would place it into
Huckin's final level of "granularity."
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and false solidarity in the switching of personal pronouns
"I" and "you" to the use of the indirect pronouns "one" and

"many" (167-168).

Through his close and critical reading

of Senator Johnson's letter, Huckin was able to identify

specific instances where the Senator was practicing
"discourse of condescension," thus identifying instances
where the Senator was exerting his governmental power.

"The clear message is that he considers himself superior to

all of us ordinary citizens—not by virtue of any inherent
qualities but by virtue of his position as a government
official" (170; emphasis added by Huckin).

Education scholar Haley Woodside-Jiron similarly looks

at political discourse, but she specifically focuses on
California education policy in reading.

In her article

"Language, Power, and Participation: Using Critical

Discourse Analysis to Make sense of Public Policy,"
Woodside-Jiron uses Fairclough's CDA theories to seek
"deeper understandings of how power operates in policy"

(Woodside-Jiron 174).

In particular, Woodside-Jiron

conducts a critical discourse analysis of public policy

concerning reading instruction in California schools
between 1995 and 1997.

Using CDA as a working framework,

she not only points out the power structures embedded in
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public policy, but she is able to "show how that power is
generated, the role individuals play in that power

structure, and the implications that those lines of power
have for policy consumers" (174).

By conducting a CDA on

reading policies, Woodside-Jiron exposes the complexities
of power relations between the producers of public policy
(typically elected and appointed politicians) and the
receivers of said policies (typically educators, students,
and parents).

First Woodside-Jiron's analyzes the way California
state bill A.B. 170 handles "given" and "new" information

to produce inequitable power structures.

"Given"

information is information that the reader already has

knowledge of and understands; "new" information is
information that is introduced and explicated after the
foregrounding of "given" information.

Woodside-Jiron

specifically analyzes section 600200.4(a) which reads:

The State Board of Education shall ensure that

the basic materials that it adopts for

mathematics and reading in Grades 1 to 8,
inclusive, are based on the fundamental skills
required by these subjects, including, but not

limited to, systematic, explicit phonics,
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spelling, and basic computation skills (qtd. in

Woodside-Jiron 182-183).
The "given" information is the fact that the State Board of
Education adopts instructional materials for public school.
The "new" information includes information on "the
fundamental skills" students must gain from these
materials, which include "systematic, explicit phonics"

(qtd. in Woodside-Jiron 183).

Logically, the bill should

define and explicate the concepts "fundamental skills" and

"systematic, explicit phonics".

At least school teachers

and parents would want to know what the policymakers mean

by these concepts.

Instead the bill forges ahead, turning

the "new" information into "given' information without
definitions or explications:

It is the intent of the Legislature that the
fundamental skills of all subject areas,

including systematic, explicit phonics...be
included in the adopted curriculum frameworks and

that these skills and related tasks increase in
depth and complexity from year to year.

(qtd. in

Woodside-Jiron 183-184)

This gap in logic between "given" and "new" information in
this legislative document lawmakers diminishes the
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possibility of the questioning of new policy by educators

and the public by introducing new and vague concepts (201),
for it is hard to question a bill after it is passed. Thus,
Woodside-Jiron points out that policymakers established and
maintain inequitable power structures between political

officials and the public.
Woodside-Jiron also points out lexical cohesion of the

determiner "the" as a site of power practice by California
policymakers.

In the phrase "the fundamental skills

required" (emphasis added by Woodside-Jiron) the seemingly

insignificant word "the" "carries with it a tremendous
amount of power", as it "serves in this context to signal

some universal agreement on how reading is acquired.

It

assigns the status of fact to phonics as the fundamental or

primary skill required in learning to read" (Woodside-Jiron

185).

In addition, the use of "the" indicates a

"commonsense agreement" between the writer (the

policymaker) and the reader (most probably educators).

In

this way, policymakers establish new public policy that

dictates what students should be learning and how teachers
should be teaching (190) .

Interestingly, individuals who

assumed power through the reading policymaking in

California in the mid 1990s were those who had the least
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contact with students, the actual consumers of the said

policy.

Thus it could be argued that these policies were a

way through which policymakers could not only exert but

maintain power within educative, as well as socioeconomic,

institutions in California.

"In the case of policymaking

around reading in education, select policy players and
policy informants took center stage while parents,
teachers, administrators, taxpayers, and students where

pushed to the margin" (Woodside-Jiron 202).
Anastasia Liasidou, education policy scholar, also

identifies unbalanced power structures articulated in

education legislation.

In her article "Critical Discourse

Analysis and Inclusive Educational Policies:

The Power to

Exclude," she examines specifically legislative language
pertaining to special education needs students in the

Republic of Cyprus between 1999 and 2001.

Liasidou argues

that although these policies attempt to include and

integrate special education needs students into the

mainstream educational system, the authoritative language
found in these documents exclude and marginalize these

students.

Through CDA, Liasidou aims to "expose the

power/knowledge grid and its subjugating attributes,
enshrined in two official legislative documents" by
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analyzing how these documents (1) construct and position

special education students,

(2) construct and maintain

"asymmetrical power relations", and (3) silence the human

rights of special education students (483) .

Yet, the fact

that education policy often has multiple authors and
multiple discursive voices (all of which have varying and
at times competing objectives and perspectives), makes it

difficult to isolate specific discriminatory ideologies
materialized through these documents.

Thus, CDA is crucial

to "disentangle the hybrid nature of the legislative

document, and expose the ways that power is implicated in
the constitution of the prevalent discursive orthodoxies

responsible for the exclusion and disparagement" of certain
groups of students (Liasidou 486).

Because CDA looks not

only at the text, the author(s), and the audience, but at
the actual social context in which the document is written,

we may be able to better understand how power ideologies
transpire through these documents.
Initially, Liasidou examines the word order in an

excerpt from Article 2 which discusses how students with
special needs should be taught "among other things the
teaching of daily routines of self-care , personal hygiene,

movement, linguistic development and communication" (489;
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emphasis in original).

According to Liasidou, the order of

these concepts denotes the prejudices of not only the

writers of the document, but Cypress society as a whole.
The fact that rudimentary tasks such as "self-care" and
"personal hygiene" are listed before academic endeavors

such as "linguistic" and "communication" development show

that special education students are seen as inferior to

regular education students.
It is apparent that these concerns imply the

well-entrenched ideological disposition that
constructed disabled children as fragile and

pathetic creatures unable to take care of
themselves and assume responsibility for their
personal well-being.

(Liasidou 490)

Thus by excluding and marginalizing special needs students,

the language in these documents constructs them as secondrate students and citizens.
Liasidou also analyzes critically the definitions of
special education needs students in the policies.

She

argues that by focusing on special education students'
deficiencies rather than stipulating on their rights or

articulating the schools' responsibilities, these policies

demonstrate discriminatory ideologies and further
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pathologize special education students.

Included in this

definition in Article 2.1 is a quote that states that
special education students have "an inability that occludes

him the potential or hinders him to use the education
facilities of the kind that schools have for the children

of his age" (Liasidou 490; emphasis in original).

Through

this definition, it is implied that special education
students are unable to overcome their biological and

cognitive deficiencies.

Moreover, because "special needs"

students are overtly compared to "regular education"
students, "special needs" students are seen as the inferior
group because they are unable to use the "educational

facilities" like regular education students.
Ultimately, Liasidou argues, these legislative

documents help to construct and maintain a "two-tier"
educational system, where special education needs students

are second-class citizens.

Yet by calling attention to the

"asymmetrical power relations" within these documents,
Liasidou is able to use CDA, a type of "emancipator

research tool" which may help educators and future

policymakers.
Understandably, the emancipator interest in
relation to CDA should not only be confined to
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its theoretical potentials in unveiling relations

of domination, but it should also be used as a
practice-based and an action-oriented subject
that, in conjunction with other subjects like,

Reflective practice, Mentoring, Evidence-based
research or Action research, can potentially

contribute to the professional development of all
those practitioners entrusted with the demanding
and thorny task of implementing inclusive

policies.

(496)

Through the use of CDA, Liasidou hopes to encourage

fundamental changes within special education practices, as

well as the public education system as a whole.

The aim of

critical discourse analysis is to highlight social,
political, and economic inequities articulated and
materialized through public documents in order to forge

change within public institutions. "The critical dimension
of policy studies should be both acknowledged and

established as a sine qua non element in the attempts
towards transformative change" (Liasidou 497).
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Critical Discourse Analysis as a Theoretical
and Methodological Framework

Without a doubt, Huckin, Woodside-Jiron, and
Liasidou's theory and methodology extend Norman

Fairclough's critical discourse analysis work.

All three

not only refer to his work throughout their own work, but

we can see how each has followed his "three dimensions, or

stages, of critical discourse analysis":
of discursive act or text;

(1) description

(2) interpretation of discursive

practice—interpretation of relationship among text,
producers and receivers;

(3) explanation of the

relationship among the text, the discursive practice, and
the broader social context (Fairclough Language and Power

21-22).

It is this third step—the analysis of the text,

the discursive practice, and their relationship to the

society as a whole—that distinguishes CDA from either
traditional rhetorical analysis or linguistic discourse

analysis.

Unfortunately, previous linguistic and

rhetorical analyses tend to ignore social conditions—the
sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and even racial contexts—

that affect texts, writers, and readers.

Linguistic

discourse analyses primarily aims to describe discursive

acts and interpret why they occur through pragmatic,
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cognitive, or semiotic theoretical frameworks.

Rhetorical

analyses aim to study how the speaker interacts with the
listener through the speech act, typically focusing on the
methods of persuasion.

In contrast, critical discourse

analysis goes beyond the discourses and discursive

practices, and interprets their social conditions and
contexts.

In addition, CDA hones into hidden ideologies

and commonly shared beliefs that drive these discourses,

scrutinizing how language helps to maintain an asymmetrical
balance of power.
In the following chapter I will conduct my own

critical discourse analysis of the following public
documents:

the Supreme Court case Plyler v. Doe, including

the language in the syllabus and the individual judge

opinions.

Using Norman Fairclough's CDA methodological

framework of three dimensional critical discourse analysis,

in conjunction with his theoretical framework of "common

sense assumptions," I will examine how underlying racial
assumptions contribute to and sustain unequal power

relations. I interpret how these documents construct
postsecondary education and undocumented students.
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CHAPTER TWO
DOCUMENTING THE UNDOCUMENTED IN PLYLER V. DOE

Plyler v. Doe may be understood as a legal response to
its anti-immigrant Zeitgeist: Worries of an increasing drug

trade and a growing recession, in conjunction with fears

that immigrants stole jobs from American citizens, fueled
the anti-illegal alien climate of the mid 1970s and early

1980s. According to the Center for Immigration Studies,
immigration increased from 3,321,677 in the mid-1960s to

4,493,314 in the mid-1970s, and although it is difficult to

decern the exact number of illegal immigrants, it can be
estimated that the undocumneted population ranged between
2.5 and 3.5 by 1980 (Edwards 3).

Overreacting to the

increasing number of undocumented immigrants and hoping to
curb an influx of illegal aliens, the 1975 Texas congress

amended the Texas education code, prohibiting the use of

state funds in educating undocumented students.
Legislators argued that undocumented "children caused
crowding in schools, that they were costly to educate

through bilingual education and that they hurt the learning
of American children" (Unmuth).

Some Texas school

districts barred undocumented students from registering and
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attending public schools.

Other school districts like

Tyler Independent School District charged undocumented

students tuitions to attend primary and secondary schools.
In response, four families sued Superintendent James Plyler

and the Tyler Independent School District arguing that
charging students tuition was unconstitutional.

Among these families was the Lopez family, who

immigrated illegally in the mid-1970s.

Despite his illegal

status,-Jose Lopez worked in a foundry in Tyler, Texas.
After several years he decided to move his wife Lidia and

his four children to the United States.

Yearning for a

better life for their children, Jose and Lidia decided to

enroll their children in the local elementary school in
1977, but encountered a roadblock:

the Tyler Independent

School District was charging a $1,000 tuition fee per

child, a cost that the Lopez family could not afford on
their below minimum wage income.

"School is very important

for all children, and they should not be discriminated

against because they are Mexican or white or black.... They
should be equal" (qtd. in Unmuth).

It was this idea of

"equality" that eventually .led the Supreme Court to rule

against Superintendent Plyler, the Tyler Independent School
District, and Texas legislators in 1982.
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Unequivocally,

"[t]he landmark Plyler vs..Doe decision guaranteed illegal

immigrants a free public education and established their
civil rights and equal protection under the 14th Amendment"
(Unmuth).

But more importantly the language embedded in

the court case documents begins to construct undocumented

students within the American educative, socioeconomic, and

political institutions.

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Plyler v. Doe

To begin to understand how undocumented students are

constructed in our current society, we must first do a
close reading of the discourses in the Plyler case.

Among

the texts are the syllabus of Plyler v Doe, the upholding
opinion written by Justice Brennan, and the dissenting
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger.

By carefully

studying these documents, we can observe not only how the

texts function in the context in which they were written
(these documents' form and function operate in the very

specific field of judicial/litigation discourse), but they
exemplify how various texts interact with each other, and

with other discourses outside the textual interaction.
Brennan's opinion, for example, not only refers to the

Plyler syllabus and Burger's dissenting opinion, but it
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also refers to other court cases as precedence, to
legislative texts involved in the case, as well as to

public opinion.

The interconnectedness of these discourses

presupposes an underlying system of beliefs (or what

Fairclough would term "common-sense assumptions").

Yet

because these "assumptions" are commonly implicit, careful
study of texts at varying levels is required.

As discussed

in the previous chapter, Fairclough devised a three stage

system to help in the critical discourse analysis of a

text, which includes the description of the text, the

interpretation of the discursive interaction, and the
explanation of the social context.1 By attending to all

three levels of the Plyler texts, we may come closer to
understanding what (if any) racial ideologies shape social

perceptions of undocumented students.

Words, Words, Words: The Construction
of Alien Children

Fairclough's first level in his CDA methodology,
involves close attention to the basic components of a text:
diction, sentence structure, and textual organization.

He

observes, "The set of formal features we find in a specific
1 Because of discourse's fluid nature, critical discourse
analysis at each of these levels may not occur independently.
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text can be regarded as particular choices from among the
options (e.g. of vocabulary or grammar) available in the

discourse types which the text draws upon" (Language and
Power 92).

Thus word choice, punctuation, and even word

order carry huge meaning, however insignificant they may

seem at first glance.
Let us look at the use of label "alien," which both

Brennan and Burger use to identify noncitizens living in

the United States.

Latino studies scholar Paul Allastson

writes that the term "alien" is a "routine US government

and legal designation for any person who is not a citizen
by birth or by the naturalization process" (129).

Yet

because it is synonymous with words such as foreigner,
stranger, and extraterrestrials, the term "alien" carries a

negative connotation. When used as an adjective, the word

"alien" signifies "excluded, inconsistent, repugnant,
estranged, opposed, hostile, and simply strange (in

appearance or character)" (Allastson 129).

All three

Plyler texts primarily use the derogatory term "alien"

instead of a more neutral term like "immigrant,"
"noncitizen," or "nonresident."2

Yes it could be argued

2 Brennan does use the terms "noncitizens" and "undocumented
persons" at the end of his opinion, yet I question why he does

38

that Brennan, Burger, and the author of the Plyler syllabus

were merely following convention and pragmatics, since
using a term that is routine and common to identify persons

who are not citizens (born or naturalized) in the United
States.

ideology.

Yet this word is by no means free of racial

Allastson writes that the term dates back to the

1798 Alien and Sedition Acts in which immigrants were seen

as "potential enemies of the state" (129).

In addition,

For many Latino/as the widespread use of "alien"
is immediately related to broader discourses of

denigration and "othering" that regard all

Latinos/as as an "alien" constituency, and thus
as somehow non-4- or un-and even anti-American.

(Allastson 129)
Understanding the pejorative power of the term "aliens," we

must question the reasons why Supreme Court Justices would
use such a word instead of a more neutral word such as
"immigrant."

In order to fully understand the underlying

racial ideologies in the selection of the term "alien," we

should also look at adjectives, synonyms, and antonyms used
in conjunction with the term.

not use these more neutral terms in lieu of the more pejorative
term "alien."
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The Plyler case syllabus opens on the premise that the

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons "due process of

law" and "equal protection of the law."

In particular, the

Plyler syllabus iterates the term "alien" by stating that

"an alien is a "person" in any ordinary sense of the term"
(202), thus protected by the Fourteenth amendment.

This

definition attempts to mollify any negative connotations
brought about by the term "alien"; yet substituting the
term with the word "stranger" in the same paragraph seems
to maintain the negative undertones of the word "alien."

Specifically, the Plyler syllabus states that "the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to anyone,
citizen or stranger" (202).

More than acting as an

antithesis to offer balance, the juxtaposition of "citizen"
and "stranger" calls attention to an underlying racial

ideology that immigrants or "aliens" are different that
normal Americans, that they are outsiders, interlopers, and

Brennan echoes this racial

even invaders in our country.

ideology by twice repeating the same word pair "citizen or

stranger" in his opinion (Plyler 214-215).

The first

instance occurs in a quotation from Representative Bingham
in an 1866 congressional debate precluding the drafting and
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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"Is it not essential

to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people

that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within
this land, shall have equal protection in every State in

this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?"
(qtd. in Plyler 214).

Placing this quote in historical

context, subsequent to the Dred Scott decision and
concurring with other Reconstruction Amendments, the term
"stranger" without a doubt conveys racial and ciassist

implications.

The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to

nullify the Dred Scott decision, which held that
descendants of Black slaves were not American citizens and

thus were not extended Constitutional protections and
freedoms; yet the Fourteenth Amendment has constructed
philosophical dichotomy between "citizen" and "non

citizen," between "citizen" and "stranger."

Despite the

fact that both are afforded the same protections and
freedoms under the Constitution, the "stranger" is

culturally, racially, and economically different.
Ironically, by affording rights and privileges to one group

(decedents of African slaves), another group (non-citizens)

is ideologically differentiated.

Brennan uses the word pair "citizen or stranger" which
again reaffirms that the Constitutional protection extends
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to both citizens and non-citizens; yet the ideological
dichotomy is reiterated by the conjunction "or."

The use

of the word "or" suggests not only comparison between

"citizen" and "stranger," but a distinction, and even a
separation between both members of American society.

Thus,

juxtaposition of terms "citizen" and "stranger" by the

conjunction "or" has an "othering" effect on immigrants,
and, by extension, immigrant students.

This "othering"

construction created by the Plyler texts underscores the

racial and ciassist attitudes that underpin the past and
current political, legislative, and judicial atmosphere and
the societal context in which they exist.
This "othering" construction of undocumented students

may also be seen by the adjectives used to describe the

plaintiffs of the Plyler case.

In particular, the Plyler

syllabus refers to the plaintiffs as "illegal aliens" (202)

and "undocumented children" (203); the Brennan's opinion
refers to them as "undocumented school-age children of

Mexican origin" (206) , "immigrant Mexican children" (207),

"alien children" (209) , and "illegal entrants" (220); and

the Burger dissent refers to undocumented students as
"illegal alien children" (244) and "Mexican immigrants"
(245).

As discussed earlier, the term "alien" carries with
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it an implication of strangeness, otherness, and even
pathology.

But adjectives such as "illegal" and even

"Mexican" amplifies the iniquitous nature of the "alien

children."

Some would argue that these adjectives merely

denote the attributes of undocumented students, yet the

word Mexican (although it signals the origination of a
person from Mexico) is a loaded word.

Besides signaling

that undocumented students are not American, it also

implies a racial and class difference.

Because

historically the majority of illegal immigrants have been
manual laborers, they may be viewed as racially inferior.
Moreover if we analyze the historical context of the word
"Mexican," we may also argue that in the past (and even in

the present) Mexicans have been seen as enemies.

Without a

doubt, the Mexican-American War of the mid-1800s has left

behind residual animosity between Mexican and American
citizens.

It is not a coincidence that the Plyler case

originated in Texas, were racial tensions between Mexicans

and Americans are in constant ebb and flow.

In reality,

the origin of undocumented students has little to no

relevance to the Plyler case.

The fact is that whether the

plaintiffs in the Plyler came from Mexico, or from
Argentina, or from France, or from China is irrelevant to
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both Brennan's justification for and Burger's dissention of
the unconstitutionality of the Texas law §21.031.

Yet the

fact that both Brennan and Burger use the adjective
"Mexican" may reveal an underlying racial ideology:

since

they find it necessary to not only identify the "aliens" as
"illegal," but as "Mexican" demonstrates a need to racially

mark the plaintiffs of this case in order to highlight
their racial and class inferiority.
This inferiority is also signaled by analogizing the

undocumented student's residential status to a "disability"

by the Plyler syllabus and the Brennan opinion.

The

syllabus reads that "the Texas statute imposes a lifetime

hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status" (Plyler 202).

Brennan concurs,

writing that:
the increases in population resulting from the

immigration of Mexican nationals in the United
State had created problems for public schools for

the public school of the State, and that these
problems were exacerbated by the special
educational needs of immigrant Mexican children,

(qtd. in Plyler 207)
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Furthermore, Brennan identifies their illegal status as

"special disabilities" (223), and stating that undocumented,
students are "disabled by their classification" (229).

The

term "disability" suggests that undocumented students
suffer from an inherent physical or mental handicap, which

in turn suggests an embedded assumption of the innate
inferiority of undocumented students.

Yes, it is true that

Brennan and the author of the Plyler syllabus may be

indicating a social "disability" (since these students are
kept on the socioeconomic and educative fringes), but one
cannot help but associate the concept of "disability" with
that of biological defectiveness possibly caused by race.
Thus the use of the term "disability" may be considered as
an indicator of underlying beliefs of the mental or
physical inferiority of undocumented students.

In conjunction with the term "disability," both
Brennan and Burger use the term "illiterate" to refer to
undocumented students.

Brennan writes,

It is difficult to understand precisely what the

state hopes to achieve by promoting the creation

and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates
within our boundaries, surely adding to the
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problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and

crime,

(qtd. in Plyler 230)

Burger agrees, "I fully agree that it would be folly—and
wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up

of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command
of our language" (qtd. in Plyler 242).

Brennan and

Burger's argument relies on the supposition that
undocumented immigrants are illiterate because of their
limited English ability.

Unfortunately, this assumption

ignores the possibility that many immigrants have been
educated in their home country.3

The presumption that

undocumented students' illiteracy also carries a sense of
shame.

Brennan writes that if not educated in public

schools, "The stigma of illiteracy will mark them

[undocumented students] for the rest of their lives" (qtd.
in Plyler 223).

By describing the condition of illiteracy

as a "stigma" or mark of disgrace, Brennan equates the

inability to read and write in English as a humiliating and
degrading circumstance, almost to the point that their

English language fluency is socially deviant.

Thusly,

3 Statistically, illiteracy rates between immigrants and native
born Americans are similar. In 2002, 70% of immigrants held a
high school diploma (Camarota), whereas 73.9 of native born
Americans held the same degree (Aud, et. Al. 65).
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undocumented students are not only inclined to be mentally
and physically deficient (as indicated in my discussion of
the use of the word "disability"), but they are also

morally and ethically defective.

This assumption that

undocumented students are unethical is extended by

Brennan's argument that if students are not taught to read
and write English, they will add "to the problems and costs

of unemployment, welfare, and crime" (Brennan qtd. in
Plyler 230). Brennan and Burger's common sense notion of

the illiterate illegal immigrant implies criminality:
Because they cannot read or write, undocumented immigrants

are utterly unemployable, and thusly their only option is a

life of crime.4

Using common sense, Brennan reasons that

undocumented students' limited English abilities will
burden American society by contributing to crime and

government welfare dependency.

Brennan does not even

substantiate his argument with any statistical data or

authoritative evidence.

His entire claim relies on the

common-sense assumption that undocumented immigrants are

4 This supposition negates the fact that millions of undocumented
workers already work for legitimate businesses in the United
States. They primarily work as manual laborers (construction
workers, crop pickers, dish washers, meat processors, and hotel
maids), in jobs in which literacy (let alone English language
literacy) , is not needed nor required.
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criminals who have illegally entered our country to take
advantage of our social programs.
Yet Brennan's assertion that uneducated undocumented

students are socially, economically, and legally liable
contradicts his previous admission that there is a lack of
evidence sustaining the argument that undocumented

immigrants are a cost to American society:
There is no evidence in the record suggesting
that illegal entrants impose any significant

burden on the States' economy.

To the contrary,

the available evidence suggests that illegal

aliens underutilize public services, while
contributing their labor to the local economy and

tax money to the state,

(qtd. in Plyler 228)

Even though Brennan argues that if not educated,

undocumented students pose a future burden on American
society and economy, he contends that there is no
statistical data that reveals that the state of Texas
suffers economically because of its illegal residents.

This contradiction seems to articulate the public's

ambivalence and confusion about the true costs of
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illegal immigration.5 Ideologically, the undocumented
student is seen as the "other," yet she is endowed with the

same unalienable rights as American citizens.

Ideologically, the "alien child" is seen as the illegal,
deviant, and pathological.

By law she is protected by the

same Constitution as American citizens.

Thus the

amalgamation of the benefits imbued by the Fourteenth

Amendment and societal common sense assumptions construct
the undocumented student as a paradoxical member of

society, one educated as an American but kept as an

outsider.

Plyler, Brennan, and Burger: Textual Interaction
within Litigation Discourses

As discussed in the previous section, there is evident
textual interaction among the Plyler syllabus, Brennan's

opinion, and Burger's dissention.

These text exemplify the

discursive interaction typical of the judicial/litigation

genre, which rely on precedents (or previous legal cases to
decide subsequent similar cases) and other authoritative
texts to support and substantiate claims. Of interest at
5 And this public uncertainty, I believe, is fueled by that fact
that undocumented immigrants live in the shadows of our society
and our economy. But this discussion I will develop further in
the next chapter.
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this point of my analysis is the use of these outside texts
and how both Brennan and Burger react to them.

Through

this reaction we not only observe the dynamics of the
interaction between Supreme Court Justices as they support

or dissent the court ruling, but we also witness how common
sense assumptions are viewed and even transformed through

judicial language.

Fairclough comments on this type of

textual interaction:

Discourses and the texts which occur within them

have histories, they belong to historical series,
and the interpretation of intertextual context is

a matter of deciding which series a text belongs

to, and therefore what can be taken as common
ground for participants, or presupposed.. As in

the case of situational context, discourse
participants may arrive at roughly the same

interpretation or different ones, and the
interpretation of the more powerful participant

may be imposed upon others.

So having power may

mean being able to determine presuppositions
(Language and Power 127).

Thus by critically viewing the outside texts Brennan and
Burger decide to use in their own texts, and by analyzing
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how their interpretations of these outside texts coincide

or differ will not only expose underlying societal
ideologies, but power struggles as well.

Of particular

interest is the reference of three Supreme Court Cases as

precedence to the Plyler decision: Trimble v. Gordon, Weber
v. Aetna, and San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.

Brennan uses all three to support his opinion

on the Plyler decision, while Burger counter argues.
In his opinion, Brennan uses the Weber and Trimble

cases to support his argument that undocumented children

should not be punished for their parents' decision to bring
them to the United States illegally.

Both held that laws

disallowing beneficence illegitimate children were
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Brennan

analogized the undocumented students' predicament to that

of illegitimate children by quoting both court cases.
Using wording from, the Trimble decision he argues that the

"parents have the ability to conform their conduct to
societal norms" and rectify their illegal status by
returning to their home country, but undocumented students

"can affect neither t,heir parents' conduct nor their own
status"

He quotes the Weber case:

(qtd. in Plyler 220).
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[V] isiting...condemnation on the head of an infant
is illogical and unjust.

Moreover, imposing

disabilities on the...child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens

should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.

Obviously, no

child is responsible for his birth, and

penalizing the...child is an ineffectual—as well
as unjust—way of deterring the parent (qtd. in

Plyler 220).
By comparing the undocumented student's situation to that

of an illegitimate child, Brennan, in essence, is comparing
the undocumented student to an illegitimate child himself.
Interestingly, the words "illegitimate" is synonymous with

"illegal" since both carry a connotation of unlawfulness to

some extent.

Yet the term "illegitimate" carries a moral

connotation: In other words, the illegitimate child is born
out of an unlawful, an immoral union.

Some may even go as

far as to say that an illegitimate child is born out of
sin.

Thus, this analogy begins to construct the

undocumented students as not only unlawful by nature, but
inherently depraved and corrupt.

Moreover, since

undocumented students, like illegitimate children, are
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portrayed as individuals who have little to no control over
their situations, they are also portrayed as individuals

who have little to no control over the actions their
depraved nature may lead them.

This analogy, much like the

description of undocumented students as "illiterate"
discussed earlier, supports the common sense assumption

that undocumented students, without guidance, will turn to
criminality.
Because of the nature of a Supreme Court Justice's

dissenting opinion, the reader anticipates opposition to
both Brennan's majority opinion and the Plyler decision.
Yet, Burger's reaction to this analogy is not to question

the analogy itself (since it is probably that both share a
similar common sense perception of depraved undocumented

student); rather he calls to question the innocence of
undocumented children.

He does this by adding quotation

marks to the word "innocent" when describing the plaintiff

children.

Although one could argue that Burger was merely

quoting Brennan's words, Brennan does not even use the word

"innocent" in the section of his text in which he discusses
illegitimate children.

Thus we can ascertain that his use

of quotation marks is meant as a sarcastic emphasis to

relay his opinion that undocumented children are not
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"innocent," that in fact they (like their parents) are
illegal entrants who are breaking the law.

In addition, he

also places quotation marks around the word "control" to

exhibit the same sarcastic affect.

Again, one could argue

that Burger is merely quoting Brennan, but I question why

he only placed quotation marks around the word "control"
rather than quote the complete sentence or phrase.

The

highlighting of the words "innocent" and "control" for

sarcastic effect seems to highlight the assumption that

undocumented students willingly and knowingly break the
law, that by choice they are criminals.

But what drives

their criminality may be more than just immoral tendencies
as insinuated by Brennan.

Burger argues that states have

the right to classify persons according to factors and
characteristics over which they may not have power.

Burger

offers his own analogy, comparing undocumented students to

mentally ill individuals:
Indeed in some circumstances, persons generally,

and children in particular, may have little
control over or responsibility for such things as
their ill health, need for public assistance, or

place of residence. Yet a state legislature is

not barred from considering, for example,
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relevant differences between the mentally healthy

and the mentally ill or between the residents of
different counties simply because these may be
factors unrelated to individual choice or any

"wrongdoing" (qtd. in Plyler 245).
In truth the analogy between a student's residential status
and mental capacity seems a bit forced, and in order for

the analogy to work the reader must assume a connection
between freedom of choice and mental capacity.

Moreover,

despite the fact that Burger does not overtly refer to

undocumented students as "mentally ill," this analogy
asserts the undocumented student's mental pathology.

Thus

an undocumented student's criminality and immorality may

not rest on her birth, but rather on her mental health.
This last analogy constructs insidiously the

undocumented student as an irrational and menacing being,
which in turn reflects and even creates a feeling of fear.
Interestingly, both the Brennan opinion and Burger's

dissent echoes this feeling of fear by referencing to

escalating number of illegal immigrants.

Brennan writes,

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws
barring entry into this country, coupled with the

failure to establish an effective bar to the
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employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted
in the creation of a substantial "shadow
population" of illegal migrants—numbering in the
millions—within our borders,

(qtd. in Plyler 218)

The use of the words "incapability" and "failure"

highlights a lack of border control, while the words
"shadow population" and "aliens" emphasize the menacing
threat that is the illegal immigrant.

Moreover, the

indefinite number "millions" incites irrational fear, if

not panic, that the United States is under attack.

This

sense of panic is maintained by Brennan's use of the phrase
"illegal entrants" (qtd. in Plyler 220, 226, 228) to depict

undocumented immigrants not only as intruders and

trespassers, but as burglars and thieves.

And all of these

descriptions not only expose the common sense assumption
that countless of illegal immigrants are swarming our

borders and invading our country.

Burger also taps into this irrational fear of "illegal
entrants" by stating that "The Court makes no attempt to
disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of

"effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national

problems by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal

aliens across our borders" (qtd. in Plyler 242).
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Burger

calls attention to the alarming fact that government has
little to no control over the invasion of "illegal aliens."
Again the image of "uncountable millions of aliens" serves
a purpose of creating fear and panic.

Consequently,

undocumented students are constructed as fearful mobs of

thieves, not unlike the pillaging Barbarians or Vandals who
invaded Europe.

Despite the use by both Brennan and Burger of the
ambiguous word "millions" to number the amounts of "illegal

entrants" into the United States, both footnote estimates
to contemporary studies of illegal immigration.

Brennan

writes in his footnote that "The Attorney General estimated
the number of illegal aliens within the United States at
between 3 and 6 million" (qtd. in Plyler 128).

Burger's

footnote concurs with Brennan's, as Burger states that "The
Departement of Justice recently estimated the number of

illegal aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6
million"

(qtd. in Plyler 242). Yet he magnifies this fear

by including a larger estimate quoted from the May 1982

edition of the Christian Science Monitor: "Other estimates

run as high as 12 million" (qtd. in Plyler 242), a number
that almost doubles the number cited by the Attorney
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By citing an estimate that exponentially grows

General.6

from 3 million, to 6 million, to 12 million seems to
amplify an already common fear of the swelling number of
"illegal aliens."

Brennan and. Burger's shared assertion of

the uncontrollable escalation of the "alien" population,
not only swells fears and panic, it also has a dehumanizing

affect on both undocumented immigrants and their children

By portraying illegal immigrants as a mob of

as well.

millions, the public no longer sees undocumented students
as people.

They are just extension's of the hordes that

overrun our borders.

Alien Versus Citizen: The Construction of
Undocumented Students to Maintain
an Uneven Social Structure
The preceding discussion focuses on the textual and

intertextual discourses surrounding undocumented students.

Many of the markers, labels, and depictions used by
Brennan, Burger, and the author of the Plyler syllabus

assert common-sense assumptions that construct undocumented

6 Interestingly, the reference to statistics from a right-winged,
Christian magazine not only highlights Burger hyper-conservative
inclinations, but I would argue supports my interpretation of
Burger's language as racially driven. By referring to a text
read—or at least known—by the general public, Burger seems to
ground his own arguments in common sense assumptions.
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students as other, as deviant, as pathological, and as
immoral.

This construction, according to Fairclough, is

indirect and unintentional:

"Reproduction is for

participants as generally unintentional and unconscious
side-effect, so to -speak, of production [of the text] and

interpretation [of the intertext]" (Language and Power
135).

Hence, the discursive interaction Burger and Brennan

shapes unintentionally the power relations and social
struggles between citizens and non-citizens.

In essence,

by dehumanizing the undocumented student, by pathologizing
her, by "othering" her, the Plyler documents, and the

discourses found therein, maintain an unequal power

structure, were white legal citizens maintain socioeconomic
and political power.

Ideally, the Plyler decision attempted to equalize

undocumented students, as it (1) articulated that illegal
aliens were "persons," and thus (2) could be protected by

the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

But that is not to say that the

group in power will not attempt to maintain an unequal
balance of power.

In fact Fairclough writes:

"On the

contrary, those who hold power at a particular moment have
to constantly reassert their power, and those who do not
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hold power are always liable to make a bid for power"
(Language and Power 57).

Moreover, since "the power

holders have surrendered power" they now "forced into less

direct ways of exercising and reproducing their power"

(Fairclough, Language and Power 60).

Thus discourses that

expose racial and ciassist ideologies use code words,
markers, labels, and depictions that aim to discredit

undocumented students, many of which are seldom questioned
because they are seen as common sense assumptions.

As

discussed previously, labels such as "illegal" and

"illiterate" criminalize the undocumented student; code
words like "Mexican" degrade undocumented students to

ethnic stereotypes; analogies to "illegitimate" children
construct an immoral being; while depiction of hordes of
millions of "aliens" dehumanize the undocumented students.

All of these are aimed to undercut the true intentions of
the Plyler decision, the creation of some semblance of

educative equality within the United States.

Yes, the

plaintiffs in the Plyler case are allowed to attend public

school alongside their citizen peers, but not without being
marked first.

Thusly undocumented students were marked as

"alien," as "strangers," as "criminals," so as to maintain
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an uneven balance of power between the "citizen" and the

"stranger."

In the next chapter I will discuss how these markers
continue to affect undocumented students well after they

I will analyze critically

graduate from public schools.

the discourse in the IIRIRA, and how it not only continues
to construct undocumented students indirectly as "stranger"

and "alien," but how constructs them overtly as criminal,
and how through legislative power, they are denied access

to postsecondary education.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE COERCIVE AND CONSENSUAL POWER OF AMERICAN

LEGISLATIVE DISCOURSES IN THE WELFARE REFORM

ACT, THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT,

AND THE DREAM ACT

Our nation is a nation of immigrants.
More than any other country, our

strength comes from our own immigrant
heritage and our capacity to welcome

those from other lands.

No free and

prosperous nation can by itself
accommodate all those who seek a better

life or free persecution. We must share

this responsibility with other

countries.
(Ronald Reagan, qtd. in Spickard 392)

In calling for support for his immigration policy
taskforce on July 30, 1981 and his subsequent 1986

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which granted

amnesty to three million undocumented immigrants, Ronald
Reagan harkens back to the ideals embodied by the first
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Pilgrims who settled Plymouth Rock and the immigrants who
traversed the halls of Ellis Island.

Moreover, Reagan

highlighted the importance of immigrants to not only our
American cultural identity, but their importance in
American economic growth and stability. Unfortunately such
a favorable view of immigration has yet to fully permeate

our national consciousness.

From the 1798 Alien and

Sedition Act, which called for the deportation of

foreigners deemed dangerous, to the 2001 anti-terrorist USA
PATRIOT Act, which sanctions the indefinite detention of
noncitizens "without charge or recourse to attorneys or

courts" (Spickard 475), United States legislation has
institutionalized discrimination against immigrants,
constructing a shared image of the illegal alien.

The

contemporary immigrant is not seen as the pious Pilgrim,
arriving at the American shores seeking religious freedom,

nor is she seen as the tireless traveler welcomed by the

glowing torch of the Statue of Liberty.

The contemporary

immigrant is seen as a shady figure or a criminal lurking
and scheming for an opportunity to rob us of the American

Dream.

As discussed in the previous chapters, most of our

contemporary societal views on illegal immigration have
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been constructed in the public discourse, which in turn has
been based on xenophobic ideologies.

Because these views

are codified in legislative and judicial documents, they
are accepted as common-sense ideology, seldom questioned or
challenged.

Moreover, it is through these common-sense

assumptions that groups in power maintain power.

According

to Norman Fairclough, there are two ways groups in power
may exercise power over any given population—coercion and

consent:

In practice, coercion and consent occur in all
sorts of combinations.

The state includes

repressive forces which can be used to coerce if
necessary, but any ruling class finds it less

costly and less risky to rule if possible by

consent.

Ideology’is the key mechanism of rule

by consent, and because it is the favoured

vehicle of ideology, discourse is of considerable

social significance in this connection.

(Language

and Power 28)
Thus much of the discussion in judicial discourses by

Supreme Court Justices Brennan and Bunger in Plyler v« Doe

can be seen as a mitigation of power through consent: Yes

there was a divergence of opinion between the Supreme Court
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Justices, but their overall assumptions about illegal
immigrants were congruent.

Their opinions articulated and

reiterated socially consensual racial ideologies about the

inferiority of undocumented students.

In contrast, laws

such as the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 and the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 attempt to control the immigrant

population through coercion, limiting what immigrants can
and cannot do within United States borders.

Yet I argue

that these acts of legislative coercion are not free of
In fact, these coercive acts

underlying racial ideologies.

are a direct result of the consensual power of common-sense

assumptions: American politicians agree upon the underlying
racial assumptions of such laws, thus they agree to pass
and enforce laws that espouse these assumptions.

Consequently the discursive power of immigration
legislation lies not only in the coercion it has on the

immigrant population, but on the consent it solicits from
the politicians, and, by'extension, the general population.
This is the case with the current situation of undocumented

students: Many US citizens agree that American society
would benefit from allowing undocumented students to

receive free K-12 education, yet a small number of
political leaders agree to allow undocumented students
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unrestricted monetary access to post-secondary education.

In fact, according to a poll published by the child

advocacy group First Focus in June 2010, 70% of the
American public favor the DREAM Act, and 69% favor states

determining the provision of in-state tuition for
undocumented students ("Public Support for the Dream Act").
Yet the DREAM Act has failed to pass in 2001, 2007, 2009,

and 2010.

Hence through consent—for the American public

has elected those politicians who in turn have voted

against the DREAM continuously—we have coerced
undocumented students from attending postsecondary

institutions by legislatively denying them access to
college.

The Welfare Reform Act, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, and
the Current Quandary of the
Undocumented Student

In 2009, Penelope was a senior planning for college.
In addition to worrying about college applications, SAT
scores, and final exams, Penelope has an additional burden:

how to pay for her college education.

Only a year earlier,

Penelope had found out about her illegal immigration

status.

She has been an excellent student; she has
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taken Advance Placement courses; she has participated

in extra-curricular activities; she has won numerous
academic awards. Yet what awaits Penelope at the end of her

high school academic road is the prospect of not attending

college. According to William Perez, "Penelope's worry

about paying for college is a common experience for" many

undocumented students.

"The financial concern for

undocumented students is even more intense because they are
not eligible for any form of federal financial aid.

Undocumented students must figure out on their own how to

pay for college" (3).

This financial limit to

postsecondary education is due to legislation passed in

1996 during the Clinton administration.

The Welfare Reform

Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) prohibit undocumented students

from applying for and receiving federal, state, and local
financial aid.

Unlike the Plyler v. Doe documents which

function on what Fairclough would term "consensus," the two

Clinton-Era laws function on a more coercive level; the
discourses in these documents legally limit access to

financial aid, thus dissuade undocumented students from

attending post-secondary institutions.
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To better understand the coercive power of the Welfare

Reform Act and the IIRIRA, and the consensual control of

the racial common-sense assumptions, we must critically
analyze the discourses in both of these documents and the
socio-political setting in which they were composed. Much

like the critical discourse analysis conducted in chapter
two, I will analyze the texts at three levels:

textual level,

(1) the

(2) the inter-textual level, and (3) social-

textual interaction level.

Unqualified Aliens, Self-Sufficient Undocumented
Students, and the Welfare Reform Act

In general, the passage of the Welfare Reform Act of

1996 (officially titled the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act) aimed to restructure the so-called

"broken" American welfare system.

Socially, it signaled a

social conservative push to the right by a Republican led
legislature by highlighting the importance of traditional

family values.

Politically, it cemented President

Clinton's re-election by appealing to the more conservative

segment of the independent electorate.

Economically, the

Welfare Reform Act perpetuated rigid class stratification,
making it harder for the working poor to access social
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services such as federal and state subsidized childcare,
housing assistance, food stamps, and health care.

As for

immigration, the Welfare Reform Act prohibited both legal
and illegal aliens from soliciting and qualifying for many

federal social services (including postsecondary federally

funded education grants and loans) available to American

citizens.

The language embodied in the 1996 Act

articulates the consensual public opinion that undocumented

immigrants (and by extension undocumented students) should
be prohibited from receiving public services.

However the

coercive power of the law falls short of its intended
purpose—the deterrence of illegal entrance and habitation

in the United States.

In theory such restrictions on

access to social services should have made illegal entrance
to and residence in the United States less appealing, yet
according to the Pew Hispanic Research Center, the number

of illegal immigrants nearly doubled between 1996 and 2000
from about 6 million to about 10 million ("Fact Sheet:

Hispanic and Arizona's New Immigration Law").

Thus, the

coercive power embedded in the language of the Welfare
Reform Act lies not in keeping undocumented students out
the United States; rather the coercive power lies in the
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law's ability to keep undocumented students out of
American's socio-economic and political mainstream.
Let us look at a few textual features to identify the

consensual common-sense ideologies embedded in the language

and thereby better understand the coercive nature of the
document.

Title IV (Sections 400 through 451) of the

Welfare Reform Act specifically concern both legal and
illegal immigrants.

Section 400 begins with what appears

to be some kind of preamble or introduction:
The Congress makes the following statements
concerning national policy with respect to
welfare and immigration:

(1) Self-sufficiency has

been a basic principle of United States

immigration law since this country's earliest
immigration statutes.

(2) It continues to be the

immigration policy of the United States that— (A)
aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on

public resources to meet their needs, but rather

rely on their own capabilities and the resources
of their families, their sponsors, and private

organizations, and (B) the availability of public
benefits not constitute an incentive for
immigration to the United States.
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(3) Despite the

principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been

applying for and receiving public benefits from
Federal, State, and local governments at

increasing rates.

(4) Current eligibility rules

for public assistance and unenforceable financial
support agreements have proved wholly incapable

of assuring that individual aliens not burden the
public benefits system.

(5) It is a compelling

government interest to enact new rules for
eligibility and sponsorship agreements in order

to assure that aliens be self-reliant in

accordance with national immigration policy

(8 USC 1601).
This introduction articulates guiding principles and
underlying beliefs about immigrants and public assistance,

as it justifies the exclusion of illegal immigrants from

using "public resources."

In particular, the use of the

terms "self-sufficiency" and "self-reliance"—which denotes
a sense of independence, autonomy, and self-reliance —

function as exclusionary markers.

Indeed the American

experience encompasses the ideals of "self-reliance" and
"self-sufficiency"; yet when one re-contextualizes the

ideals of "self-sufficiency" and "self-reliance" into our
71

earliest American history, one begins to question the

validity of these ideals.

Consider one of the earliest

traditional narratives of American immigration.

Although

it is true that the Pilgrims attempted to survive on their
own in the American wilderness, the Native Americans not

only fed and clothed them, but taught them how to adapt to

a new environment.

This sense of magnanimity and community

is absent from the language in the Welfare Reform Act.
Instead we find exclusionary language that obliges illegal

aliens to fend for themselves.

According to the text, "self-sufficiency" is a basic
principle of both our "earliest immigration statutes" and
current immigration policy.

Let us look at past

immigration policy to further understand the connotative

meaning of the terms "self-sufficiency" and "self-

reliance ."

According to historian Paul Spickard, the

"earliest immigration statutes" include the 1790

Naturalization Act (which restricts citizenship to free
white males), the 1907 Expatriation Act (which took

citizenship from women who married foreign nationals), and
the 1917 Immigration Act (that required an admittance

literacy test)

(467-471).

These laws and others listed by

Spickard seem to entail an exclusionary element—keeping
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immigrants from actively participating in American society,
politics, and economy.

Hence, through the historical

context of previous xenophobic immigration legislation,
"self-reliance" and "self-sufficiency" can be taken as
coded words with more negative connotations.

In this

context, these terms are synonymous to exclusionary words

such as separation, isolation, and disconnection.

This

concept of exclusion not only verbalizes the share public
sentiment that illegal aliens are different and separate

from the rest of the population, but it prohibits them from
taking part of American society physically.
Section 401 of the Welfare Reform Act eventually

details the public benefits that illegal immigrants are
prohibited from accessing.

According to this subsection,

"an alien who is not qualified...is not eligible for any
Federal public benefits" including:
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional

license, or commercial license provided by an

agency of the United States or by appropriated
funds of the United States; and (B) any
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public

or assisted housing, postsecondary education,
food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any
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other similar benefit for which payments or

assistance are provided to an individual,
household, or family eligibility unit by an

agency of the United States or by appropriated

funds of the United States (8 USC 1611.).
As discussed in chapter two, the term "alien" although
commonly used in judicial and legislative documents, does

carry a pejorative connotation.

In addition, the term

serves an exclusionary purpose, constructing the

undocumented immigrant as a "stranger," "foreigner," and
Of further interest is the use of the adjective

"invader."

"not qualified," which modifies and qualifies the noun
"alien."

The term "not qualified" perpetuates the negative

assumption that undocumented immigrants are "unskilled,"
"incompetent," and "unfit."

Yet more interesting is the

grammatical choice of the negative particle: instead of

constructing a morphological negation by using the prefix
"un" to construct the adjective "unqualified," the

composers of the Welfare Reform Act used syntactic negation

by placing the negative particle "not" before the adjective
"qualified."

According to linguists Councill, McDonald,

and Velikovich, this form of negation indicates explicit

denial (51), highlighting the negative particle, rather
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than modifying the phrase itself.

I argue that this

stresses or emphasizes the negative particle rather than
the complete adjective phrase further expressing the notion

that undocumented immigrants are inferior to not only

American citizens, but legal residents.

The use of the

syntactic rather than the morphological negation also
indicates that undocumented immigrants are somehow marked,
that they are different from the normal population.
Moreover, the use of the phrase "not qualified" connotes an

unchangeable state of being compared to the changeable

quality of the adjective "unqualified."

The use of the

qualifier "not" is much more stringent than the prefix
"un": Although an immigrant is currently "unqualified," she

may one day receive authorization to become qualified in

the future; whereas an immigrant is "not qualified" will
never be qualified.

Sections 401 and 411 of the Welfare Reform Act

specifically outline benefits and services illegal aliens,

and by extension undocumented postsecondary students, may
not receive.

In short, these sections prohibit

undocumented students from applying for and receiving any
type of grants, loans, or postsecondary assistance

subsidized by federal, state, and local governments.
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In

addition, undocumented students cannot apply for any type
of federal, state, or local professional or commercial
licenses.

The restriction to federal grants, loans,

postsecondary assistance seems to follow the principle
contention in Section 400 that undocumented immigrants

should not "depend on public resources" and be "self-

reliant."

Yet the exclusion of undocumented immigrants

from professional and commercial licenses seems
questionable.

public service.

In truth, licenses do not constitute a
In fact, licenses are paid for by

applicants looking to permit, authorize, and/or certify

certain practices and/or professions.

Thus, the

prohibition of undocumented students from attaining
professional and commercial licenses does not follow the

"self-sufficiency" philosophy.

On the contrary, such

restrictions keep undocumented immigrants from exercising
"self-reliance" by prohibiting them from obtaining driver's

licenses, working permits, and professional credentials.

Moreover, such restrictions actually push undocumented
immigrants into the underground cash economy, relying on

illegal ways of making money.
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Undocumented Postsecondary Students and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act
Because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act was signed into law only nine months
after Welfare Reform Act, and because both deal with

prohibitions on illegal immigrants, one can be seen as an
extension and expansion of the other.

Whereas the Welfare

Reform Act restricted educative and economic prospects to
undocumented students, the IIRIRA criminalized their

attempts to seek and attain state and federal aid to pay
for postsecondary education.

In previous judicial and

legislative documents, the notion of undocumented students

as "criminals" was inferred through the labels and

modifiers used, but in the IIRIRA details of criminal
penalties and fees were finally articulated.

Thus

undocumented students ran the risk of not only deportation

if they were apprehended, but were subject to jail time,
monetary penalties, and criminal fingerprinting.

As

indicated previously in this chapter, such laws did very
little to deter illegal immigration; in fact the number of

illegal immigrants doubled between 1996 and 2000 ("Fact
Sheet: Hispanic and Arizona's New Immigration Law").

Thus,

although the IIRIRA verbalized a consensual anti-immigrant
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sentiment, it did very little to coerce unauthorized

immigrants from crossing the border of the United States.
The impetus of the IIRIRA ignored one simple fact:

Millions of illegal immigrants had come to United States as
children and were culturally Americans.

Many of them do

not even realize that they are illegal until high school

graduation is near and they go in search of their social

security card in order to apply for a job, to join the
military, or fill-out their Free Application for Federal

Student Aid.

Thus, the coercive power of the IIRIRA lies

not on its ability to deter illegal immigrants from coming

into the United States, nor does this power lie in IIRIRA's

ability to persuade illegal immigrants to return to their
countries of origins.

The coercive power of the IIRIRA

lies in its ability to keep undocumented immigrants in the
socio-economic and political shadows of American society,

thus guaranteeing a working sub-class that is forced to

work for pennies on the dollar without any educative
prospects of escaping the cash economy.

'With the passage of the Welfare Reform Act,
undocumented students are prohibited from applying for
and receiving postsecondary financial assistance,

and subsequently attaining any professional or
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commercial licenses.

Yet, the IIRIRA goes even further by

restricting economic access, limiting the eligibility for
preferential treatment of postsecondary undocumented

students on the basis of residence:

an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States shall not be eligible on the basis

of residence within a State (or a political
subdivision) for any postsecondary education

benefit unless a citizen or national of the

United States is eligible for such a benefit (in

no less an amount, duration, and scope) without
regard to whether the citizen or national is such
a resident.

(8 USC 1623)

As evident in this passage, many of the racial linguistics
constructs present in the Plyler v. Doe and Welfare Reform
Act are present here: we see the use of the pejorative
terms "alien"; we see the emphasis on negative particle

"not" to signal exception; we see the ideological

juxtaposition of "alien" versus "citizen."

All of these

textual markers articulate the underlying racial assumption
that undocumented students are subordinate to American
citizens.

Moreover because of their illegal status,
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undocumented students should not be allowed state or local
financial benefits including in-state tuition.

Interestingly, the Welfare Reform Act which was signed

into law on January 3, 1996 gave state and the local
government the freedom to choose to allow any benefits to

undocumented immigrants through the legislative process.

Acknowledging state rights, as allotted by the Tenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Welfare Reform Act
authors provided a provision in Section 411 that allowed
the states the authority to offer state and local benefits

to undocumented immigrants:
A State may provide that an alien who is not

lawfully present in the United States is eligible

for any State or local public benefit for which

such alien would otherwise be ineligible under
subsection (a) only through the enactment of a
State law after the date of the enactment of this

Act which affirmatively provides for such

eligibility.

(8 USC 1621)

Yet in Section 505 of the IIRIRA seems to have repealed

this freedom months later, on September 30, 1996:
SEC. 505. LIMITATION ON ELIGIBILITY FOR
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF ALIENS NOT LAWFULLY
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PRESENT ON BASIS OF RESIDENCE FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION BENEFITS,

(a) IN GENERAL.-

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an
alien who is not lawfully present in the United

States shall not be eligible on the basis of

residence within a State (or a political
subdivision) for any postsecondary education

benefit unless a citizen or national of the

United States is eligible for such a benefit (in

no less an amount, duration, and scope) without
regard to whether the citizen or national is such

a resident.

(8 USC 1623)

In attempts to appease the staunchest conservative members

of American Society, lawmakers stripped states of the
Constitutional right to decide whether to allow
postsecondary students in-state tuition and other state

financial aid.

Understandably, states have vested

interests in deciding to whom to offer state financial aid.
By establishing residential guidelines and allowing lowered

in-state tuition to state residents, states favor taxpaying

residents to guarantee a well educated state population.

In addition, colleges and universities that offer in-state
tuition to residents motivate high school students
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graduating at the top of their class to remain in their
home states, thus contributing to their states economic,
social, and cultural growth.

Yet the main stipulation

of Section 505 of the IIRIRA ignores states' socio

economic interests in allowing in-state tuition to
undocumented students.

Instead, Section 505 articulates

the common-sense notion that undocumented students take

away benefits from all American citizens and all legal
residents.

By stating that undocumented students are not

eligible for in-state tuition "unless a citizen or national
of the United States is eligible for such a benefit," the

language in IIRIRA reiterates the ideology that
undocumented students steal from taxpayers and from all

American students.

Moreover, where the language Section

411 of the Welfare Reform Act motivates states to prohibit
undocumented students' in-state tuition through consent,

Section 505 of the IIRIRA drives states to comply through
coercion.

It is interesting to view both the IIRIRA and the
Welfare Reform Act in the context of other Clinton Era

legislation.

In particular, if we contextualize these two

pieces of legislation with the 1994 North American Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), we may be able to better understand the
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racial and economic implication on illegal immigrants and,
by extension, undocumented students.

In essence, NAFTA

attempted to free up commerce and trade among Canada,

Mexico, and the United States by eliminating tariffs on
imports and exports.

One can argue that NAFTA was driven

by corporate interests and corporate ideology, that NAFTA,
along with the IIRIRA and the Welfare Reform Act were

written to benefit American business and industry.

Unfortunately, the construction of such unilateral policies
disenfranchised the working class.

As Spickard argues,

After NAFTA, Mexico saw the value of its exports
skyrocket....Meanwhile, Mexico lost 2.8 million
farm jobs, compared to a gain of only 700,000

j obs in export manufacturing. Mexican and
American capitalists were thriving, but Mexican

farmers were losing out to U.S. agriculture.
These economic forces, the direct results of

international trade policy, pushed Mexicans out
of agriculture and northward in search of jobs.

(370)

Because of NAFTA, American agricultural and manufactured

exports increased and by extension so did the demand of
cheap manual and agricultural labor.
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Yet comprehensive

immigration legislation was not drafted during the 1990s to
attend to this basic economic supply and demand.

In

contrast, through the Welfare Reform Act and IIRIRA a more
conservative stance was articulated compared to the 1980s'
"Amnesty" legislation.

In fact, "Amnesty" became a dirty

word, as more and more Americans came to the consensus that
allowing undocumented immigrants legal residency and
citizenship meant rewarding criminality. Thus, political
discussion about immigration reform results in stalemates,

as the illegal immigrant population continues to increase.

Fairclough states,
The power of the capitalist class depends also on

its ability to control the state: contrary to the
view of the state as standing neutrally 'above'
classes, I shall assume that the state is the key
element in maintaining the dominance of the

capitalist class, and controlling the working

class. This political power is typically

exercised not just by capitalists, but by an
alliance of capitalists and others who see their

interests as tied to capital.
Power 27)
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(Language and

Accordingly, we can see the monetary limit to postsecondary

access and the congress's inability to pass comprehensive
immigration reform as a coercive act to maintain

undocumented students in the underclass of illegal

immigrants. Moreover, economically limiting undocumented
students to postsecondary education benefits American
capitalism, as manufacturing and agricultural companies

were guaranteed an unlimited supply of cheap labor.

The Promise of a Dream: The Undocumented Student
and the Prospect of the DREAM Act

On May 11, 2011 the United States House of

Representatives and Senate reintroduced the DREAM Act, a
bill that "would grant legal status to undocumented

immigrants brought to the USA illegally if they attend
college or serve in the military, and meet other

conditions" (Camia "Democrats in Congress Renew Fight").
Yet despite the support from Democratic President Barack

Obama, the DREAM Act has very little chance of passing
through the Republican dominated House of Representatives
and the conservative dominated Senate.

Republican

representatives such as Congressman Lamar Smith from Texas

and Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama call it "amnesty,"
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which rewards criminals and encourages illegal immigration

(Camia).

In essence the inability to pass the DREAM Act

represents the racial common-sense ideology, despite
evidence that passage of the bill would be economically

beneficial to the country.

According to a 2010

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget cost estimate, the
passage of the DREAM Act would "increase revenues by $2.3
billion" and "net direct spending by $912 million" over a
ten years; in addition, "enacting the bill would reduce

deficits by about $1.4 billion" over the same ten year
period ("S. 3992").1

Despite the good intentions of the DREAM Act, if we
carefully analyze its wording, we can see the continuation

of the racial ideology first presented in the Plyler case,
the Welfare Reform Act, and the IIRIRA.

The introduction

reads: "To authorize the cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status of certain alien students who are

long-term United States residents and who entered the
United States as children and for other purposes" (H.R.

1842).

Like the judicial and legislative documents I have

1 According to the CBO, the increase of revenue and spending
depends the increase of income taxes paid by undocumented
students legalized through the DREAM Act and their increase of
income. In addition, undocumented students would provide income
into both the Social Security and Medicare systems
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analyzed previously, this introduction also uses the

inferiority marker "alien."

Yet its use of terms such as

"students," "children," and "residents" signals a move to
humanize the undocumented student.

Yet if we go beyond the

introduction and analyze the wording of the document

itself, the language reverts to labeling these "children"
and "residents" as "aliens."

The continued use of the

inferiority marker "alien" in the complete text of DREAM
Act signals a continuance of "othering" of undocumented

students.
The actual listing of conditions for legal residency

and citizenship in Section 3 of the document is even more

telling: the alien must (1) be moral,

(2) maintain a

continual present in the United States (3) cannot be a
convicted criminal,

data,

(4) submit biometric and biographical

(5) have a background check, and (6) have a medical

examination.2

Although such requirements can be seen as

indicative of any person attempting to gain legal status in
the United States, we can also consider how these

requirements have articulated racial ideologies.

2 I provide abbreviated list requirements from the DREAM Act. For
a comprehensive listing of all requirements, please refer to H.R.
1842, the actual text of the 2011 version of the DREAM Act.
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The first requirement—found in Section (3)

(b)

(1)

(C)—states that an undocumented student must "be a person
of good moral character."

This requirement raises the

question of how this can be measured and judged; but more

importantly, the condition calls to question the morality
of undocumented students.

As discussed in chapter two,

because undocumented students are considered "aliens," they
are considered corrupt, immoral and delinquent, which can

be construed as systematic "pathologizing" of people of
color, for race becomes a physiological indication of
amorality and deviance.

Thusly if undocumented students

are allowed to gain access to postsecondary education, and

subsequently allowed a pathway toward citizenship, they
must prove moral and ethical character.
This questioning of morality further leads to the

questioning of allegiance, as Section (3)

(c)

(2)(A) brings

to question the undocumented student's loyalty and duty to

the United States:

An alien shall be considered to have failed to

maintain continuous physical presence in the
United States...if the alien has departed from the
United States for any period in excess of 90 days

or for any periods aggregated exceeding 180 days.
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This calls into question the loyalty of undocumented

students.

The majority of undocumented students have lived

most of their lives in the United States and have been

educated in American schools, thus they consider the United

States their home.

Yet legislators question the

undocumented student's allegiance.

Moreover, the discourse

of morality and allegiance as presented in the DREAM Act
maintains that ethics and fidelity are inherent to those

that hold an American birth certificate or a legal
residency card or a US passport.

It does not take into

consideration that Americans are socialized to be loyal;
that American morals and ethics are learned through years

of education and upbringing that every student (whether
legal or illegal) can learn.
The fourth and fifth requirement listed above involves
the submission of personal data for background check

purposes.

Section (3)

(b)

(3) reads "The Secretary may not

grant permanent resident status on a conditional basis to

an alien under his section unless the alien submits

biometric and biographic data, in accordance with

procedures established by the Secretary."
Section (3)

(b)

(4)

And according to

(i) and (ii) this "biometric and

biographic data" will be used "to conduct security and law
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enforcement background checks... [and] to determine whether
there is any criminal, national security, or other factor
that would render the alien ineligible for such status."

Although background checks are commonly requested when
immigrants apply for legal residential status and

citizenship, one may question the broad scope of these
requirements.

The rationale for the background checks is

obvious and explicit in subsections (i) and (ii>, yet the

undefined scope of "biometric and biographical data" allows
for speculation.

What type of biometric data will be

collected and for what purpose?

Will this biometric and

biographical data be shared with various state, federal,
and global agencies? Where will this data be stored and

secured?

Because none of these issues are addressed in the

body of the DREAM Act draft, the conceived implication and
repercussions can be wide.

The act of collecting such data

espouses the common-sense notion that undocumented students
are pathological; and the storage of such data suggests the
fear that undocumented students may become criminals in the

future. Moreover, the undefined methodology of
biometric/biographical data collection may lead one to

infer that such methodology would lead to broad
interpretation by the federal government.
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Common biometric

and biographical data requested for legal residence and

citizen application include information about residence,
work history, and fingerprinting.

But the use of the term

"biometric data" encompasses the collection of

physiological data such as DNA, as well as face, iris, and
voice recognition.

In addition, biometric data also

encapsulates the collection of behavioral data.3

Such

inclusive definition of biometric data may raise questions
over the collection and storage of personal data.

Are we

risking privacy and civil liberties in the name of the ever

elusive national security?

Is there a danger of using

biometric data as a surveillance tool or for racial
profiling?
The medical examination requirement may warrant

similar concerns.

Sections (3)

(b)

(5) reads,

An alien applying for permanent resident status

on a conditional basis under this section shall
undergo a medical examination. The Secretary,
with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, shall prescribe policies and

3 For comprehensive information on current biometric data
collection methods and applications, please refer to the National
Science and Technology Council website at www.biometrics.gov.
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procedures for the nature and timing of such

examination.
Much like subsection (4), this requirement offers no

explicit rationale or methodology for the collection of

such biometric data, leaving Section (5) open to wide
interpretation.

Are we attempting to prohibit the

legalization of immigrants with certain medical conditions

or diseases?

Will this data affect undocumented students

Much like Subsection (5),

educative and work prospects?

the conditional medical exam may be construed as an

invasion of privacy.

It would seem that politicians are

willing to sacrifice privacy and civil liberties in

attempts to keep illegal immigrants off of American soil.
Although, the DREAM Act requirements detailed above
may signal attempts by politicians to move more to the

right in order to gain support for this bill, conservative
politicians continue to vote against it.

In fact,

cosponsor Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana
refused to support the re-introduction of the bill arguing
that Democrats were politicizing illegal immigration.

According to a Lugar spokesman, Obama has "framed
immigration as a divisive election issue instead of

attempting a legitimate debate on comprehensive reform"
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(Mark Helmke qtd. in "DREAM Act Loses Republican").

Notwithstanding, Lugar admittedly "supported the
initiative, but he wanted them to work on getting more

Republican support" ("DREAM Act Loses Republican").
Similarly, Republican Senator John Cornyn supports the

DREAM Act in theory, but states:

This bill, sadly, does nothing to fix our broken
immigration system [....] It may be worse that
we’re providing incentive for future illegal

immigration. This bill does nothing for border

security, workplace enforcement, visa overstays,
which account for about 40% of illegal

immigration in this country. In other words it

does nothing to reduce the likelihood of future
illegal immigration,

(qtd. in Cohen)

Both Cornyn and Lugar not only contradict their own
opinion, but they contradict public opinion, which supports

the passage of the DREAM Act.

In addition, they negate

logical reasoning for passage of the DREAM Act: the
socioeconomic benefits of allowing undocumented students

monetary access to postsecondary education and providing a
pathway for legal residence and citizen to undocumented

students, as detailed by the CBO.
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Instead both deviate to

common-sense -assumptions that illegal immigration is out of

control and that illegal aliens steal American jobs, abuse
our welfare system, and increase crime.

Fairclough

explains that this discursive discrepancy between belief
and action, like that of Lugar and Cornyn, "deflects

attention from an idea which could lead to power relations

being questioned and challenged—that there are social
causes, and social remedies, for social problems" (Language
and Power 71).

Despite the questionable racial language in

a bill, the passage of a bill such as the DREAM Act would

begin to erode common public assumptions of the racial
pathology of undocumented students and, by extension,

illegal immigrants. The passage of such a bill would bring
to light the socioeconomic marginalization of undocumented
students and, by extension, illegal immigrants.

The

passage of such a bill would begin to equalize
postsecondary access by undocumented students, hence

destabilizing the power of the capitalist class over

American sociopolitical and economic institutions.

Thus

Lugar and Cornyn's refusal to support the DREAM Act and

Congress's refusal to pass it in spite of public (and
personal) opinion and economic remuneration can be
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perceived as an authorial act of keeping undocumented
students as permanent members of the hidden underclass.

Defying Ideology: Undocumented Students and the
Accessing of Postsecondary Education
The current impasse of the DREAM Act is indicative of
the hyper-partisan atmosphere of the 112th Congress: the

legislature is politically divided by a House of

Representatives compelled by newly elected ultra
X
conservatives and a marginally Democratic Senate.

In

addition, the economic turmoil beginning in December 2007
has heightened anti-immigration sentiment across the United

States.

As evident by state legislation enacted in 2011,

underlying racial ideology continues to materialize
legislation that is ethically and morally questionable (as
Arizona's SB 1070--the so called "Paper's Please" law), and

economically unviable (like Georgia's HB 87, which has
caused a shortage of farm workers in that state).

The

political partisanship and the on-going economic recession,
in conjunction with the racial common-sense assumptions
concerning illegal immigration will undoubtedly continue to

push the DREAM Act off the legislative table.
Consequently, many undocumented students will forgo
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postsecondary education, mostly because they cannot afford

it, but mainly because there are no prospects upon earning
college diplomas.
As I have discussed previously, the economic limits on
postsecondary education institutions by the Welfare Reform

Act and the IIRIRA are coercive acts of maintaining
undocumented students in a lower economic stratum, thus

guaranteeing a cheap labor force for the capitalist class.
But I argue that such limitations on education are

limitations on "access to discourse types," restricting
what Fairclough would term "discoursal positions of power"

(52). In other words, without postsecondary education,
undocumented students may be less likely to understand the
political discourses that construct them and, consequently,

are less likely to question and change the inequitable

power structures that oppress them.

Thus, the DREAM Act

impasse cannot simply be seen as an act of disenfranchising

undocumented students, but an act of silencing them.

Conversely the application, attendance, and graduation by

tens of thousands undocumented students to and from
postsecondary institutions can be seen as subversive acts

of defiance.

Fairclough writes, "Access to prestigious

discourse types and their powerful subject positions is
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another arena of social struggle" (Language and Power 60);
hence elitist members of a capitalist society struggle to

maintain pow^r by limiting access to postsecondary

institutions, while undocumented students strive to gain
power by applying, attending, and graduating from
postsecondary institutions in spite of these limitations.
Let us look at a specific example of how access of

"prestigious discourse types" has defied hegemonic
ideology.

On June 22, 2011, Pulitzer prized journalist

Jose Antonio Vargas published an autobiographical article
in which he exposed his illegal status.

Vargas' story

embodies the experience of many undocumented students:
Vargas unknowingly, unintentionally entered the United
States illegally; he was socialized and educated as an
American; and Vargas contributed to the cultural, social,

and economic growth of this country.

Essentially, Vargas

personalizes and humanizes the undocumented student.

With

his narrative of how he won a spelling bee in elementary

school, or how he rode his bicycle to the DMV to get his

license at age 16, Vargas reconstructs the undocumented
student as an ordinary kid with ordinary life experiences.
Thus his story offers an opposing view of the undocumented
student.

Contrary to the pathologized identity of the
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undocumented student that has been constructed by

legislative and legal documents, Vargas reconstructs the
undocumented student as fundamentally American, calling

into question our common-sense assumptions about
undocumented students and illegal immigrants.
But more importantly, Vargas's decision to articulate
his experiences as an undocumented student subverts the

code of silence espoused by current immigration policy,
giving voice to those who those dare not speak in fear of

retribution.

"I'm done running," Vargas writes,

I'm exhausted. I don't want that life anymore.

So I've decided to come forward, own up to what

I've done, and tell my story to the best of my

recollection. I've reached out to former bossesand employers and apologized for misleading them
— a mix of humiliation and liberation coming with
each disclosure.

[...] I don't know what the

consequences will be of telling my story.

("My

Life as an Undocumented Immigrant").

Besides conveying his life experiences, Vargas's story also
expresses regret and remorse for the wrong he has done in
order to survive in this country.
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In addition, his

expression guilt conveys a sense of hope and urgency that
the situation for undocumented students will soon change.

Without advocating for the DREAM Act directly, the reader
is forced to imagine how Jose Antonio Vargas's life would

be different if he were allowed legal residence and
ultimate citizenship: He would be able to travel around the

world as a journalist; he would be able visit his mother
who he hasn't seen in over 18 years; and he would be able

leave a life of fear of being arrested and deported.
Moreover, Vargas's story allows us to question what
potential we are denying by limiting undocumented students

access to postsecondary education and a pathway to
citizenship.

What other potential Pulitzer Prize winners,

innovative scientists, or groundbreaking political leaders
are being kept out of our universities?

And is it

socially, ethically, and economically viable to sacrifice
such potential in the name of ideology?

Vargas's story is also a clear example of how "having

access to prestigious sorts of discourse and powerful
subject positions enhances acknowledged status and
authority" (Fairclough, Langauge and Power 53).

It is

through this "enhanced acknowledge status and authority"

that Vargas is able to defy underlying racial assumptions.
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Because Vargas was able to acquire "prestigious sorts of
discourse" through his postsecondary education, and because
he was able use this "prestigious" discourse to articulate
the quagmire of the undocumented student via a

"prestigious" platform (that of the New York Times

Magazine), Vargas was able to address a wider audience,

including members of the public who would have otherwise
dismissed him as merely another illegal alien.

So should

we advocate more undocumented graduates and professionals
to defy common-sense ideology and come forward to voice

their experiences?

Unfortunately, to ask undocumented

immigrants to expose themselves is not only unethical, but
unwise.

What can be done is to continue to examine closely
discourse that unfairly constructs undocumented students
(and illegal immigrants for that matter) in the attempts to

better understand how racial ideology, imbued in public

rhetoric, continues to maintain undocumented students at
the margins of the United States society.

As I have shown

through my rhetorical analysis, critical discourse analysis
offers a way to identify latent ideologies that sustain

inequitable power relations within any given society. Yet
the power of CDA lies not only in the ability to merely

100

identify hegemonic ideologies, but in the ability to

question, challenge, and change these ideologies.

As

Fairclough writes, "A critically oriented analysis can

systematize awareness and critique of ideology.

From

awareness and critique arise possibilities of empowerment
and change" (Critical Discourse Analysis 83).

Hence CDA

functions not only as a theoretical and methodological

framework from which to study discourse and its social
context, but it acts as a transformative catalyst, with the

potential to revolutionize social structures and
institutions.
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